No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism - Université de Rennes Access content directly
Journal Articles Axiomathes Year : 2014

No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

Baptiste Le Bihan


According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
BLB_axio.pdf (183.53 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00997544 , version 1 (28-05-2014)



Baptiste Le Bihan. No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism. Axiomathes, 2014, 24 (4), pp.483-497. ⟨10.1007/s10516-014-9236-9⟩. ⟨hal-00997544⟩
385 View
245 Download



Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More