

**The Origins of Youth Social Citizenship in Europe: Religion,  
Trade Unions and Income Support for Young People**

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# The Origins of Youth Social Citizenship in Europe: Religion, Trade Unions and Income Support for Young People

## Abstract

This paper is concerned with the development of young people's access to income support in Europe. This access can be either "familialized", where young people are seen as children, which leads low level of welfare generosity, or "individualized", where they are seen as adults, with higher level of welfare generosity. I argue that two main factors can explain such cross-national variation. First, religion (and Protestantism is particular) is the main driver explaining the development of individualization, as opposed to familialization, through long-lasting institutional effects. Second, as outsiders on the labour market, the better represented young people are in trade unions, the more likely they are to access individualized generous social benefits. To test this argument, I rely on a multimethod research design: initially proceeding with time-series cross-sectional regressions across 18 countries, from 2001 to 2018, before turning to comparative historical case studies of youth social citizenship development in France, the UK and Sweden.

**Key words:** Europe; political economy; religion; trade unions; welfare state; youth

**JEL classification:** I3 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty; P16 Capitalist institutions, welfare state

## 1. Introduction

T.H. Marshall wrote that “the adult male is the citizen *par excellence*” (T. H. Marshall, 1963, p. 83). Indeed, the concept of “citizenship” is usually assumed to concern adults, rather than children. But when does a person become an adult, *i.e.*, a citizen – for the welfare state? Following Marshall’s seminal distinction between the different types of citizenship, it seems that “civil” and “political” citizenships have progressively converged: in most *European* countries nowadays, people become civil and political citizens as they turn 18. However, as soon as we turn to “social” citizenship (that involving social rights and the possibility of entitlement to social benefits), things get more complicated. For instance, it is possible to claim social assistance at the age of 18 in the UK, 25 in France, and there is no official age limit in Sweden<sup>a</sup>. This diversity is puzzling: why does the age of social citizenship differ so *much* between these countries?

This puzzle raises the issue of young people’s access to social citizenship; indeed, youth has been defined in very different ways in sociology. The “cultural” approach dates back to the 1950s’ emergence of “youth” in the US and Europe (Furlong 2013). However, the “transitional” approach has identified youth as a new period in life emerging in the 1970s. I define here youth within the latter approach (Threadgold 2019), youth being a period between childhood and adulthood, *i.e.* between dependence and independence (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011). This new phase of life concentrates socioeconomic vulnerability: many works have stressed rising levels of youth unemployment (O’Reilly et al., 2019), poverty (Fahmy, 2014) and “outsiderness” (Marques & Salavisa, 2017), underlining the fact that young people increasingly face a form of “new social risk” (NSR) (Bonoli, 2005; Ferragina et al., 2015). However, comparative literature on the welfare state has thus far remained fairly limited on the topic of young people’s social coverage and access to social benefits, since the way the welfare state copes with this transformation of the life course

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3 remains to be investigated: how does the welfare state support young people in Europe, and what  
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5 are the factors of cross-national diversity in that regard?  
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8 This article examines the comparative institutional development of “youth social citizenship”–  
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10 that is, young adults’ access to income support (i.e above the age of 18) – in Europe. I suggest that  
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12 young people’s access to social protection depends on how “youth” is conceived within the life  
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14 course. Where young people are seen as *children*, their social citizenship is “familialized”, so that  
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16 they cannot claim income support in their own right (since their parents are supposed to take care  
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18 of them), whereas where they are seen as *adults*, it is “individualized”, allowing them to claim  
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20 social protection in their own right as individuals, independent of their parents’ situation. I argue  
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22 that such variation can be explained by two main factors. First, Protestant religious heritage has  
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24 paved the way for individualization of youth social citizenship because of the early fusion of church  
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26 and state, with an established national church: this meant early state intervention in welfare  
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28 provision (even before youth became a specific age period), leading to low age limits, hence  
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30 individualization and the recognition of young people as full social citizens. Second, I show that  
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32 when young people participate in “inclusive” trade unions (Gordon, 2015; Thelen, 2014), these  
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34 unions are more likely to take their specific outsiders’ preferences into account in terms of income  
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36 support, hence fostering welfare generosity towards the young.  
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42 This article’s first contribution is the theorization and operationalization of the way the welfare  
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44 state covers young people. Though several scholars have underlined the issue of the age orientation  
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46 of different social policy spending (Lynch, 2006; Tepe & Vanhuyse, 2010), very few have  
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48 attempted a systematic analysis of the cross-national variation of welfare generosity towards young  
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50 people in particular (Antonucci et al., 2014), and scholars working on the “new welfare state”  
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52 (Bonoli & Natali, 2012) usually focus on either women or immigrants as NSR groups, or on “active  
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54 social policy” (Bonoli, 2013) or “social investment” in general (Garrizmann et al., 2022), which  
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3 concerns education, childcare, or active labour market policies most of the time, rather than  
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5 traditionnal income support programmes. Yet, rising levels of social vulnerability among young  
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7 people, exacerbated in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, urge us to further investigate this  
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9 specific aspect of the “new welfare state” which continues to rely on income support, or “social  
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11 consumption” (Beramendi et al., 2015), even though it now targets a new group of welfare  
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13 beneficiaries that is scarcely taken into account in the literature: young people (Bonoli, 2005;  
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15 Chevalier, 2016). Here, I therefore deal with the “new welfare state” in terms of new group of  
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17 beneficiaries instead of new social policy instruments.  
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21 The article’s second contribution lies in its dialogue with neo-Rokkanian studies on the origins  
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23 of the welfare state and the role of religion. However, unlike most scholars using a neo-Rokkanian  
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25 framework (Manow, 2009; Van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009), I am arguing against the fact that  
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27 youth social citizenship stems from the importance of Catholicism and class coalitions in  
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29 continental countries, leading to a strong state/church cleavage in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and  
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31 subsequently the central role of Christian-Democratic parties in continental welfare states. I show  
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33 by contrast that the first origin of individualization was the rise of Protestantism in the 16<sup>th</sup> century  
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35 and its “institutional” effect on state-church relationships. Rather than the “shadow of the  
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37 nineteenth century” so often emphasized in the comparative political economy (Iversen & Soskice,  
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39 2009; Martin & Swank, 2011), it is the significance of the shadow of the *sixteenth* century, with  
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41 the **role** of the Reformation, that seems of crucial importance here.  
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47 Next to this long-term effect of religion, the article’s third contribution concerns the more  
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49 recent role played by trade unions in the new politics of welfare reforms. Studies on dualization  
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51 have stressed the fact that unions are more likely to reflect insider preferences, and thus would  
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53 foster dualization trends at the expense of outsiders (Lindbeck & Snower, 1988; Palier & Thelen,  
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55 2010) – including young people. This article, on the contrary, emphasizes unions’ ability to foster  
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3 more generous social coverage for young outsiders when young people are an important part of  
4 their constituency. By stressing the importance of age alongside the education level and  
5 employment status, it speaks to the literature on the inclusiveness of unions and their socio-  
6 demographic profiles (Gordon, 2015; Mosimann & Pontusson, 2017; Thelen, 2014).  
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12 In the next section, the article details the theoretical framework around youth social citizenship  
13 and its origins. The third section presents the multimethod research design. In the fourth section, I  
14 use a cross-case analysis to statistically test my hypotheses, estimating the effects of Protestantism  
15 and trade unions on youth social citizenship through time-series cross-sectional regressions on 18  
16 countries, between 2001 and 2018. In the fifth section, I complement this cross-case analysis with  
17 a comparative within-case analysis: in order to understand the effect of Protestantism, I compare  
18 the UK (where there is an individualization of youth social citizenship together with a Protestant  
19 heritage) and France (with both familialism and Catholicism), while to assess the importance of  
20 trade unions, I compare Sweden (with inclusive trade unions) and the UK (where we find a low  
21 participation of young people in unions). The final section serves as a conclusion.  
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## 38 **2. Theorizing the origins of youth social citizenship**

### 39 ***2.1. Familialization vs. individualization***

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42 The sociology of youth has long shown the extent to which the transformation of the life course  
43 has led to the rise of a new period between childhood and adulthood, known as the period of  
44 “youth” (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011). The comparative literature on the welfare state has started  
45 taking young people into account because they usually form part of the population hit hardest by  
46 the rise of NSR (Bonoli, 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2004) and the trend toward “dualization”  
47 (Emmenegger et al., 2012) resulting from transition to a post-industrial economy. However, the  
48 issue of “age” is usually not analysed *per se* in this literature.  
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3 One exception to this is Lynch (2006), who has proposed a comparative analysis of the  
4 welfare state specifically through the lens of age. She concludes that “occupational” welfare  
5 regimes are more elderly-oriented, with higher spending on pensions and elderly services, while  
6 “citizenship-based” welfare regimes are more non-elderly-oriented, with higher spending on  
7 unemployment benefits, active labour market policies, and family benefits and services. The reason  
8 for this is that citizenship-based welfare states deliver benefits not necessarily related to any past  
9 presence on the labour market, hence offering better protection to labour market outsiders – among  
10 whom are young people. Conversely, occupational welfare states provide protection for insiders,  
11 i.e. among them older people. Yet ultimately it is more an analysis of how welfare states cope with  
12 vulnerable people and dualization than it is one of age in particular: if outsiders or vulnerable  
13 people were old (as was the case immediately after WW2), the argument would be reversed since  
14 citizenship-based welfare states would then be pro-elderly. In other words, Lynch analyses age  
15 *indirectly*, by identifying the age profile of welfare recipients *ex post*.  
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33 Unlike works that do not focus directly on the specificity of young people *per se*, Antonucci  
34 et al. (2014) have tried to analyse such specificity by showing that the “welfare mix” (the  
35 combination of labour market, welfare state and family) differs from one country to another, largely  
36 reflecting welfare regimes typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Such typology has also been largely  
37 used in youth studies (Walther, 2006). In order to understand the role of the state in structuring the  
38 transition to adulthood and access to full citizenship, two distinct policy dimensions must be  
39 distinguished though: the first is related to the school-to-work transition, regulated by education  
40 and active labour market policies (ALMP), whereas the second concerns income support, which  
41 encompasses both social policies and student support. Social policies and student support are two  
42 forms of income support not usually analysed in a single work, since the young unemployed and  
43 students (Antonucci, 2016; Garrizmann, 2016) are two different groups of welfare beneficiaries. I  
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3 suggest however that within the framework of “youth social citizenship” - which relies on how  
4 young people are conceived according to their situation in their life course – it is possible to analyse  
5 them together.  
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10 Indeed, the life course has been institutionalized by the welfare state into three periods  
11 (Kohli, 1986): childhood, adulthood, and old age. This institutionalization has three implications  
12 (Figure 1). First, people are supposed to be engaged in different social activities depending on  
13 which period they are in: children should be in (full-time) education; adults should be employed in  
14 the labour market; and old people should be retired from work. Second, their situation in terms of  
15 access to social citizenship is also different: children are dependent on their parents, since they are  
16 “inactive” (that is, in education) and thus not “active” (on the labour market) and can therefore  
17 access social benefits only indirectly as “dependents” (assuming there is some sort of support from  
18 parents towards their child); adults are supposed to be independent and can therefore claim benefits  
19 in their own right; old people are retired and thus entitled to pensions. Third, the three periods can  
20 be formally distinguished via the introduction of age limits (such as the age for the end of  
21 compulsory schooling, or legal retirement age).  
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44 If the problem of young people stems from the transformation of the life course and the  
45 complexification of entry into adulthood, how are young people considered by the welfare state in  
46 respect to this distinction? Do they belong to childhood or adulthood? Chevalier (2016) has argued  
47 that there are two ways for the welfare state to structure young people’s access to income support,  
48 depending on whether they are seen as “children” or “adults” (Table 1). Where they are seen as  
49 “children”, there is a “familialization” of youth social citizenship. Maintenance obligations  
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3 continue to hold parents responsible for their child's financial support, even after reaching the age  
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5 of civil majority, since they are still deemed dependent. High age limits (usually around 25) prevent  
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7 them claiming social benefits in their own right. Insofar as children are supposed to be dependent  
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9 while in full-time education, students are supported via family policy (tax relief for parents, family  
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11 benefits) and student grants dependent on parental income: these are designed to help low-income  
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13 parents support their child still in education, rather than to promote independence from the family.  
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15 Since age limits are high and young people cannot directly access income support aimed at  
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17 fostering their independence, overall welfare generosity towards them is therefore fairly low.  
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28 Conversely, where young people are seen as "adults", social citizenship is "individualized"  
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31 <sup>1</sup>. Parental maintenance obligations end when children reach civil majority, when they are deemed  
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33 financially as well as legally independent. Age limits are low (around 18) allowing them to claim  
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35 social benefits in their own right like any other adult social citizen. Though they are still in  
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37 education, students are no longer considered children: there is no family policy supporting them,  
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39 and the student grants (and loans) that do support them are no longer dependent on parental income  
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41 - since their objective is to guarantee some form of independence. As a result, this form of support  
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43 is extended, in the sense that it is meant to benefit most students - unlike familialized student grants,  
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45 which remain restricted to students coming from low-income families. Because young people are  
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47 institutionally considered full social citizens, welfare generosity is higher in this model.  
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54 <sup>1</sup> These two concepts of "familialization" and "individualization" stem from the feminist literature on the welfare state,  
55 which has underlined the importance of the dependence towards the family in order to understand their social  
56 citizenship (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996).  
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## 2.2. Hypotheses

To account for such diversity, I suggest two main sets of explanations. The first set has to do with religion. The literature on the welfare state has developed a neo-Rokkanian approach to welfare development in order to account for welfare regimes, and more specifically for the continental “Christian-Democratic” welfare regime (Manow, 2009). In fact, while previous scholars have focused mainly on the economic cleavage opposing left (labour) and right (capital) (Huber & Stephens, 2001), other studies have emphasized the importance in continental countries of the “cultural” cleavage opposing church and state in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Such a political cleavage has led to the importance of Christian-Democratic parties, at the origin of the specific features of continental welfare states, such as the importance of the familialization of social rights (Van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). In fact, the Catholic social doctrine, through the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), has fostered the principle of subsidiarity, which gives communities (especially the family) the first role in welfare provision. As a result, the familialization of youth social citizenship is likely to be more pronounced in continental countries in which Catholicism is the main denomination, leading to the importance of class coalitions and Christian-Democracy in the party system (Manow, 2009).

Such a hypothesis sees in Catholicism the principal factor leading towards familialism because of its social doctrine (unlike other religions) and considers the important cleavage to be the one that set the state and the Catholic church against one another in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. And this relates to a “political” mechanism that relies on class coalitions and party politics. Conversely, I want to stress the importance of another significant cleavage in Europe: the one due to the sixteenth century Reformation that led to the rise of Protestantism and its long-term *institutional* effect on the welfare state. Where Protestantism became the main religion, the state merged with the church very early on, with the creation of an established state church incorporating former

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3 duties of the (Catholic) church in terms of welfare provision, echoing Morgan's (2006) and Ansell  
4 & Lindvall's (2013, 2020) arguments, though on different topics. As a result, social policies - such  
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6 as poor relief (in the shape of Poor Laws) and, later on, unemployment support, developed earlier  
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8 in such countries in comparison with countries in which the church, whether Catholic or not,  
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10 maintained control of welfare provision for a longer period of time. Because these policies were  
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12 adopted at a time in which **the age of youth was not extended as much as today**, age limits were  
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14 very low (for instance, the age limit of the unemployment insurance scheme adopted in the UK in  
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16 1911 was 16), and this facilitated the individualization of youth social citizenship later on.  
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18 Conversely, where those social policies were adopted later on, especially at a time when youth had  
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20 become an age of life and a trade-off had emerged between elderly-oriented and youth-oriented  
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22 spending due to budgetary restraints, higher age limits were more likely to be implemented – hence  
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24 familialization (for example, the first minimum income scheme adopted in France was in 1988,  
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26 with an age limit at 25).  
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33 The second set of explanations has to do with a potential age-based political cleavage, and  
34 especially with the potential effect of youth mobilization. The literature on recent welfare state  
35 reforms has underlined the fact that young people are usually among the categories of the  
36 population hit hardest by the transformation of the labour market and the shift towards a post-  
37 industrial economy (Emmenegger et al., 2012). And because “NSR groups” or “outsiders” –  
38 including young people – have fewer power resources, their political mobilization is fairly  
39 inefficient in terms of gaining better access to the welfare state: in fact, Bonoli has argued that NSR  
40 coverage depends not on NSR groups’ mobilization (because of the weakness of their power  
41 resources), but rather on the fact that their interests can be “picked up by politicians and are, rightly  
42 or wrongly, believed to be vote winners” (Bonoli, 2005, p. 446). Accordingly, we should expect  
43 the rise of some kind of a “grey power” (political mobilization of the elderly, favouring public  
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3 spending towards the old) (Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012), although Tepe & Vanhuysse (2010)  
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5 consider welfare regimes to have much more effect on the age-oriented aspect of social policies  
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7 than does a supposed “elderly bias”.  
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10 I hypothesize that youth mobilization does have an effect on youth social citizenship: the  
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12 more young people mobilize, the more individualized their social citizenship is. First, this could be  
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14 through voting: the more young people vote, the more responsive policymakers would be to their  
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16 interests, and hence the more individualized their social citizenship would become, mirroring the  
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18 electoral power of the elderly (Vlandas, 2018). Second, it could be through their participation in  
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20 trade unions. The literature has shown that unions have played a crucial role in social policies in  
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22 general (Visser & Ebbinghaus, 2000). More specifically, how unions represent atypical workers  
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24 has an effect on how such workers are covered by social protection: it all depends on their  
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26 “inclusiveness” (Gordon, 2015). Accordingly, the more young people participate in unions, the  
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28 more access to social citizenship they would earn. Third, the literature on political participation has  
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30 highlighted the fact that new generations tend to engage in “non-institutional” forms of political  
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32 participation (Albacete, 2014), such as demonstrations. I could therefore hypothesize that such  
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34 mobilization could also have an effect on youth social citizenship. The hypotheses are presented in  
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36 Table 2.  
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### 49 **3. A multimethod research design**

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51 I rely on a multimethod research design to test these hypotheses. Following Goertz (2017), I  
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53 articulate a “cross-case” analysis with a “within-case” analysis. The cross-case analysis allows me  
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3 to identify the main factors explaining youth social citizenship. To do so, I proceed with time-series  
4 cross-sectional (TSCS) regressions on 18 countries, from 2001 to 2018. I then turn to historical  
5 comparative within-case analysis in order to fully understand the causal mechanisms at play,  
6 explaining how the previously-identified factors do have an effect. Hence, I rely on a “pathway”  
7 selection strategy (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016, p. 405): the objective is to come up with a  
8 “diagnostic” in order to assess my hypotheses using an analysis of cases “where the apparent impact  
9 of  $X$  on  $Y$  conforms to theoretical expectations and is strongest (in magnitude)”. Accordingly, to  
10 assess the effect of Protestantism, I compare the two opposite cases of the UK (with  
11 individualization and Protestantism) and France (with Catholicism and familialism), and to assess  
12 the effect of the participation of young people in unions, the two Protestant cases of Sweden (high  
13 participation of young people in unions) and the UK (low participation in unions).  
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#### 30 **4. Cross-case analysis: TSCS regressions**

##### 31 ***4.1. Dependent variable***

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33 In order to operationalize my dependent variable – youth social citizenship – I construct a  
34 composite index made out of two variables concerning two categories of young people:  
35 replacement rates, in order to seize welfare generosity towards the young unemployed, and student  
36 support coverage, which allows to identify welfare generosity towards young people in higher  
37 education. Replacement rates are a good measure of welfare generosity mainly used in the  
38 literature, and are supposed to be linked to youth social citizenship: the more individualized the  
39 latter, the higher welfare generosity. Since they do not include recipient’s age, I was unable to use  
40 the replacement rate or welfare generosity indicators from the SCIP or the CWED datasets  
41 (Scruggs, 2013), as is mostly done in the literature: it is impossible to know what these measures  
42 are for young people. I have therefore used the OECD’s online “Tax-benefit web calculator” to get  
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3 replacement rates for young people. More precisely, I computed such replacement rate for a typical  
4 youth pattern such as a single, childless 20-year-old, without a job for the past two months, with  
5 zero months of social security contributions, and previous earnings equal to 0% of the average  
6 wage, but annual housing costs of 20% of the average wage. The calculator then gives the  
7 replacement rate (net income as a percentage of the national average wage) on the basis of a detailed  
8 comparative analysis of legislation on entitlements, taking into account unemployment benefits,  
9 social assistance and cash housing benefits for rented accommodation.  
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19 The second variable is student support coverage, because student support, in addition to  
20 being a form of income support available to young people alongside actual social policies, is  
21 directly related to youth social citizenship: the more individualized youth social citizenship, the  
22 more extensive student support coverage is (Chevalier, 2016). I was unable to use the OECD  
23 indicators, as they do not cover enough years<sup>b</sup>. I therefore used the indicators provided by Eurydice  
24 in the publications *National Student Fee and Support Systems*, which covers a wide range of  
25 countries since 1999 (in 1999 and then between 2001 and 2018). This is why the sample comprises  
26 European countries only. The correlation between the two variables is fairly high ( $R^2 = 0.69$ ). To  
27 arrive at my youth social citizenship index, I then calculated the mean of the two variables: the  
28 higher this gets, the more individualized and generous it is. Figure A1 shows the evolution of the  
29 index from 2001 to 2018, per country (Appendix). If we use the average over the years by country,  
30 and then distinguish the countries based on the general mean, we have: Greece, Italy, Hungary,  
31 Switzerland, Portugal, Poland, Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain, Austria, Germany and Slovenia  
32 as familialized countries on the one hand, and Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, Sweden,  
33 Finland and Denmark as individualized countries on the other.  
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#### 53 **4.2. Independent variables**

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3 To measure the impact of Christian-Democracy (H1), I used the share of seats of centre  
4 parties in total cabinet posts from the *Comparative Political Data Set* (Armingeon et al., 2019), as  
5 is usually done in the literature (Busemeyer, 2015; Garritzmann, 2016). In order to grasp the long-  
6 term effect of the heritage of past Christian-Democratic cabinets, I also systematically included the  
7 1960-2001 average as an alternative (in the Appendix). To measure the long-term effect of  
8 Protestantism (H2), I have coded countries based on their religious history (using the works of  
9 Martin, 1978; Norris & Inglehart, 2004): these are coded 1 when there is no significant tradition of  
10 Protestantism, 2 when Protestantism is significant as a religious minority in mixed countries, and  
11 3 when Protestantism is the main religious denomination (see Table A1 in the Appendix).  
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24 As far as age-based hypotheses are concerned, I have used data from eight waves (2002-  
25 2020) of the *European Social Survey*. Electoral participation (H3) is measured for the young (aged  
26 18-29). The participation of the young in trade unions (H4) is also measured for 18-29 year-olds,  
27 as is participation of the young in demonstrations (H5), in order to collect data on non-institutional  
28 participation. The definitions and sources of every variable, along with descriptive statistics, can  
29 be found in Tables A1 and A2 (see Appendix).  
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### 37 **4.3. Control variables**

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39 I have also included in the models a range of control variables described in the Appendix. First, it  
40 is necessary to control for the significance of historical family formation patterns (Banfield, 1958;  
41 MacFarlane, 1978). Many works have focused on the difference between countries where the  
42 “joint” family was the predominant type of family in pre-industrial Europe and countries where the  
43 “stem” family was more widespread, depending on property rights (Ruggles, 2010). In the former,  
44 every child could stay in the parental house and work on the family farm. But in the latter, only the  
45 first born could inherit the farm, forcing all the other sons to leave the parental home in order to  
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3 form their own households. Thus, it could be that in countries where the joint family had been more  
4 prevalent, the familialization of youth social citizenship would be more pronounced.  
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8 Second, Bonoli (2013) has shown that the timing and the size of NSR have an effect on  
9 policy responses. Subsequently, I have included the youth poverty rate as a control variable. Third,  
10 although scholars working on NSR and social investment have shown this to no longer necessarily  
11 be the case (Beramendi et al., 2015; Bonoli, 2013; Bonoli & Natali, 2012), the literature has long  
12 shown that welfare generosity can be best explained by the power of the left (Esping-Andersen,  
13 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001). Scholars have also considered that a “balanced generational  
14 welfare contract” (one that does not favour any single age group - childhood, adulthood, or old age)  
15 depends on the presence of strong leftist parties (Birnbaum et al., 2017). The share of seats for left  
16 parties in total cabinet posts is therefore included here.  
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28 Third, in the context of permanent austerity, it can be argued that, because of limited  
29 resources, there is a trade-off between spending directed at the elderly and that directed at the  
30 young. As a result, there would be a “crowding-out” effect of elderly-oriented spending (Bonoli,  
31 2013), which is included here.  
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37 Fourth, labour market regulation is also part of the welfare state, in the sense that it can  
38 serve as a way of protecting workers from labour market risks (Emmenegger, 2009). Since young  
39 people are more likely to be “outsiders” (present on the secondary labour market, i.e. in atypical  
40 jobs like temporary contracts, part-time jobs, interim), the regulation of atypical employment  
41 matters more to young people. Like elderly-oriented spending, it could be hypothesized that there  
42 would also be a trade-off here: in order to provide young outsiders with some kind of social  
43 protection, policymakers could turn to either stricter regulation of temporary employment (which  
44 is cheaper), or income support.  
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56 Fifth, social spending as a share of GDP is also added in the models.  
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#### 4.4. *Statistical estimation*

I use an unbalanced panel data set covering 18 European countries<sup>c</sup> from 2001 to 2018; missing values have been linearly interpolated (Busemeyer 2015) for the main variables with missing values: student support coverage, young people political participation (vote, unions, demonstration), but also for the regulation of temporary employment<sup>d</sup>. Since I have pooled time-series, TSCS regressions (in which units of analysis are country-year) are most appropriate. Most scholars now use Prais-Winsten estimations (Beck & Katz, 2011), estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) without lagged dependent variables but with first-order auto-regressiveness (ar1 corrections) together with panel-corrected standard errors. Such statistical estimation helps mitigate the problems of serial correlation, groupwise heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation that are common with such data, as is widely acknowledged in the literature (Busemeyer, 2015). This is therefore the estimation chosen here over the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable that would both absorb much of the substantively-interesting data variation and risk biasing independent variable estimates (Plümper et al., 2005).

Scholars sometimes add country dummies and/or period dummies to such estimations. Country dummies allow omitted variable bias to be addressed, while period dummies control for common (economic) shocks. Because I am more interested in between-country differences than I am in within-country changes, and because some of my main independent variables are time-invariant (such as Protestantism), I have not included country dummies.

#### 4.5. *Results*

The results of my statistical analyses are presented in Table 3. As far as religion is concerned, H1 does not seem to be validated since there is no effect of Christian-Democratic parties in Model 1. To the contrary, Model 2 confirms H2 about Protestantism since its effect is both positive and significant. This effect remains robust in Model 6 where all the variables are included.

[Insert Table 3 here]

As far as my hypotheses on young people's political participation are concerned, only their participation in trade unions seems to have a consistently significant positive effect in Models 4 and 6, confirming H4: this is in contrast to the literature arguing that unions drive dualization, necessarily at the expense of outsiders (Lindbeck & Snower, 1988). In addition to not being significant in every model, the other variables of participation also fail to display the expected sign, which does not allow to validate H3 and H5. Overall, Protestantism (H2) and youth mobilization in unions (H4) not only have a significant effect in every model, unlike the other independent variables, but they also have the biggest effects on youth social citizenship when taking into account control variables (Figure 2).

[Insert Figure 2 here]

Concerning control variables (see details in the Appendix), the effect of the legacy of the demographic structure and type of family patterns is uncertain: the effect of the household size in 1950 is only significant in Models 2 and 6, but not in the other four models. And when significant, the sign of the coefficient is opposed to what might be expected according to the literature (large family patterns lead here to individualization). To the contrary, the findings of Bonoli (2013) and Rueda (2007) on the lack of effect of left parties on NSR and outsider-oriented policies are confirmed - like Bonoli's findings on structural trends and the effect of unemployment (only significant in Models 3 and 5).

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3 However, this is not the case for policy-oriented variables, since it seems that two  
4 institutional trade-offs do indeed exist: between high spending on old age and an individualized  
5 youth social citizenship (confirming Bonoli's findings about the crowding-out effect of old age  
6 spending due to budgetary constraints) on the one hand (significant effect in every model), and  
7 between strict regulation of the secondary labour market and individualization on the other (also  
8 significant in every model). Lastly, the effect of social spending is also consistently significant: the  
9 more generous the welfare state is in general, and the more it is for young people in particular.

10  
11  
12 In terms of robustness checks (see Appendix), I have tried using alternative estimations  
13 (using lagged independent variables, without a period dummy, and with random effects; OLS  
14 regressions) as well as using different measures for both my dependent variable (only with the  
15 replacement rate, and with a replacement rate calculated for a different youth profile) and my main  
16 independent variables (share of social contributions in total taxation - aka "Bismarckian index" -  
17 instead of Protestantism, an alternative measure of Christian Democracy from Schmidt et al 2023,  
18 and union density instead of the participation of young people in unions), which produced  
19 substantively comparable results to those reported above, underlying the consistent effects of both  
20 Protestantism and young people's participation in unions.

## 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 **5. Within-case analysis: comparative historical case studies**

43  
44 In this second part of my multimethod research design, I proceed to two controlled comparisons of  
45 two opposite case studies in order to confirm and illustrate previous quantitative findings. The  
46 idea is to compare a positive case with a negative case, regarding both the DV and the IV. The first  
47 comparison opposes individualization on the one hand (UK) and familialization on the other  
48 (France) in order to identify the role of religion (Protestantism vs Catholicism), while controlling  
49 for participation in unions (low level in both countries) (Figures 3 and 4). The second comparison  
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3 aims at identifying the role of unions, hence the comparison between the UK (low participation in  
4 unions) and Sweden (high participation in unions), **associated with** different levels of welfare  
5 generosity though proposing an individualized access to social benefits for young people, while  
6  
7 controlling for Protestantism (present in both countries<sup>2</sup>). In this section I will focus on income  
8 support towards the young unemployed in particular and I rely here on secondary literature.  
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17 [Insert Figure 3 here]

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19 [Insert Figure 4 here]

### 20 21 22 23 24 ***5.1. Protestantism and the individualization of social rights: UK vs. France***

25  
26 As shown in the foregoing section, Protestantism seems to be associated with the individualization  
27 of youth social citizenship. By comparing a positive case of Protestantism and individualization  
28 (UK) with a negative case (France)<sup>e</sup>, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, I will now trace the mechanisms  
29 linked to the long-term institutional (early fusion of church and state) effect of Protestantism.  
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35 The spread of Protestantism, and its imposition as the main religion in some countries, led  
36 to the early fusion of state and church (Morgan, 2006), and subsequently to the introduction of Poor  
37 Laws during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the UK, the Reformation led to the  
38 sixteenth century split between Henry VIII and the Catholic church and the development of  
39 Anglicanism as the main confession. The salient point here is that, together with the Anglican  
40 church, the monarchy incorporated missions previously held by the Catholic church, one of which  
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54 <sup>2</sup> The theological forms of Protestantism are of course different in the UK and Sweden, but the main point here is to  
55 underline their institutional similarity through the absorption of the church by the state because of the break up with  
56 Roman Catholicism.  
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3 was charity to the poor. This early fusion between church and state empowered the state to act in  
4  
5 terms of welfare provision, leading to the implementation of the Poor Laws.  
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8 The English Poor Law of 1601 established local government's role in managing the poor  
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10 by limiting begging, setting categories of poor (worthy and unworthy), and creating a poor tax  
11  
12 (Flora & Heidenheimer, 1981). In 1834, the Poor Law Amendment Act, in an attempt to reinforce  
13  
14 the work ethic, ended outdoor relief (monetary or in-kind payments) for able-bodied males and  
15  
16 made indoor relief (putting the poor at work in so-called workhouses) truly intolerable – yet also  
17  
18 confirmed a publicly-funded national and centralized poor relief system, with the early presence of  
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20 an age limit of 16. In France, however, the Reformation did not result in a split with the Catholic  
21  
22 church, so that welfare provision largely remained in the hands of the church. Public intervention  
23  
24 towards the poor thus remained almost non-existent, until the very end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Manow  
25  
26 & Palier, 2009).  
27  
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30  
31 The British *National Insurance Act* of 1911 introduced a small compulsory unemployment  
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33 insurance<sup>3</sup> which included an age limit: anyone over the 16 could claim its benefits. The age of 16  
34  
35 was chosen because the age of the end of compulsory schooling was supposed to soon be raised  
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37 from 14 to 16 (Harris, 1989, p. 46). In 1934, when unemployment assistance (available to those  
38  
39 who were either ineligible for unemployment benefit, or had exhausted their entitlement) was  
40  
41 introduced, the same age limit of 16 was enacted. The debate around age limits reflected the idea  
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43 of the “tripartition” of the life course in which childhood infers dependency because of being in  
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45 education: as a result, the age limit to access social benefits had to be the age of the end of  
46  
47 compulsory schooling.  
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54 <sup>3</sup> “Unemployment insurance” concerns contribution-based unemployment benefits while “unemployment assistance”  
55 relates to means-tested benefits for the unemployed. “Social assistance” also provides means-tested benefits but not  
56 only for the unemployed, also for the inactive.  
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3 The Beveridge report, and the legislation that followed it, also confirmed the idea that  
4 financial independence should be fixed at the age of 16, especially concerning the new National  
5 Assistance scheme and Family Allowances (Harris, 1989, pp. 54–58), though the age of civil  
6 majority was still 21 at the time. The 1986 *Social Security Act* later introduced a new social  
7 assistance scheme (*Income Support*) in 1988, raising the lower age limit at which benefits could be  
8 claimed from 16 to 18<sup>f</sup>, though the compulsory schooling age stayed at 16. This was however in  
9 line with the lowering of the age of civil and political (right to vote) majority from 21 to 18 (1969).  
10 Such low age limits illustrate the individualization path followed in the UK.  
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21 Meanwhile in France, with a long-term tradition of Catholic welfare provision, the state did  
22 not adopt Poor Laws, and when it eventually started to provide some social assistance at the end of  
23 the 19<sup>th</sup> century (as a result of a victory by anti-clerical Republicans) neither a single social  
24 assistance scheme nor an unemployment insurance programme was introduced (Manow & Palier,  
25 2009). The national unemployment insurance programme was only introduced in 1958, with an  
26 age limit set at 21 (the age of civil majority at the time) - unlike the age limit of unemployment  
27 support in the UK (which used to reflect the age of the end of compulsory schooling).  
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38 In France, young people were excluded in 1979 from unemployment insurance and oriented  
39 towards unemployment assistance: under 25, they could claim the flat-rate benefit targeted at  
40 newcomers on the labour market. Although the age of civil majority was lowered from 21 to 18 in  
41 1974, the age limit of 25 had been used more and more in the 1970s, alongside the rise in youth-  
42 related issues: housing benefit has been available to workers under 25 since 1971, and the first  
43 ALMPs, (implemented in 1977 to tackle growing youth unemployment - *Pactes pour l'emploi des*  
44 *jeunes*) targeted young people under 25 (Askenazy, 2011, p. 80) too<sup>g</sup>. In 1984, implementation of  
45 the flat-rate benefit *allocation d'insertion* (Lima, 2015, pp. 18 and following) unified these benefits  
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3 for 16-25 year-olds. However, the replacement rate of this benefit was very low, since it was  
4  
5 intended to be subsidiary – a complement to family support (Lima, 2015, p. 25).  
6

7  
8 The same rationale underlies the age limit of 25 written into the very first unified National  
9  
10 Assistance scheme, the RMI (*Revenu minimum d'insertion*), which was created in 1988 (Palier,  
11  
12 2005). First, this benefit was meant to be subsidiary, with family support supposedly remaining the  
13  
14 first provider of welfare. Second, welfare dependency had to be discouraged. Third, the *allocation*  
15  
16 *d'insertion*, as well as ALMP programmes for young people (as part of the so-called *politique*  
17  
18 *d'insertion*), were available to them anyway (though these did not deliver any income support).  
19  
20 Yet the *allocation d'insertion* was abolished in 1992 for the same reasons (Lima, 2015), achieving  
21  
22 the familialization of youth social citizenship by excluding young people from unemployment  
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24 support and confirming 25 as the official age of social citizenship.  
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31 [Insert Figure 5 here]  
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36 Access to social citizenship in the UK at the age of 16, then 18 illustrates its  
37  
38 individualization, whereas the age of 25 has been gradually imposed in France, illustrating its  
39  
40 familialization. Figure 5 shows these divergent trends in both countries: in the UK there is a gradual  
41  
42 convergent trend of age limits for the end of compulsory schooling, political majority, civil  
43  
44 majority and social majority (whether via family benefits or social assistance) around the age of  
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46 18, while in France the mismatch remains significant, in particular because the age of social  
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48 majority is set at 25 (social assistance) - hence its familialization.  
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### 51 **5.2. The role of youth-inclusive trade unions: Sweden vs. UK**

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53 The development of youth social citizenship has also reflected the level of young people's  
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55 participation in trade unions. In fact, since the 1970s, the shift towards a post-industrial economy  
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3 has left young people particularly vulnerable on the labour market. As a result, the young  
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5 unemployed have become a significant proportion of potential unemployment support recipients,  
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7 since they are particularly at risk of both unemployment and atypical employment. Their  
8  
9 mobilization in unions can therefore affect union preferences in terms of unemployment support,  
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11 subsequently changing how policymakers adapt social policies to the specific situations faced by  
12  
13 young people.  
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17 To trace this mechanism, I compare a positive case of high participation of young people in  
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19 unions (Sweden) with a negative case (UK), controlling for Protestantism: both are Protestant  
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21 countries with individualized youth social citizenship, yet some difference concerning the level of  
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23 replacement rates persists as the level remains lower in the UK than in Sweden (Figures 3 & 4). I  
24  
25 focus on the period from the 1980s to 2018.  
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28  
29 Sweden is the most prominent example of a “Social-Democratic” welfare regime (Esping-  
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31 Andersen, 1990) featuring a fairly high level of “macrocorporatism” (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin  
32  
33 & Swank, 2012). To understand the effect of unions on unemployment support, it is necessary to  
34  
35 go beyond the basic measure of “union density” generally used in the literature. Gordon (2015) has  
36  
37 shown that unions must be analysed in the light of three dimensions: density (level of membership),  
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39 centralization (level of collective bargaining) and involvement in the administration of  
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41 unemployment benefits (whether Ghent, bipartite or tripartite arrangements are in place, or non-  
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43 involvement). These three dimensions taken together pick up the “inclusiveness” of unionism on  
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45 which the efforts targeted at outsiders depend: the more inclusive unions are, the higher the outsider  
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47 effort.  
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51 According to Gordon, Sweden<sup>h</sup> represents the highest level on the “inclusive unionism  
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53 index” (1985-2005), with a score of 78.7 (as opposed to 21.6 for the UK, which is at the bottom of  
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55 the index), while being the second only to Denmark in terms of outsider effort (measured as  
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3 unemployment benefit effort + ALMP effort). And van Vliet & Wang (2019) have shown that  
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5 union density prevents reductions to benefits levels, even for social assistance.  
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8 Although the growing dualization of the labour market has put the system under pressure,  
9  
10 especially insofar as young people are concerned, because of rising unemployment among this  
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12 group in the 1990s, Sweden has followed an “embedded flexibilization” trajectory (Thelen, 2014)  
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14 in which, despite decreasing “strategic coordination”, social coverage has remained both fairly high  
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16 and “solidaristic” to outsiders. Thelen has shown that this trajectory is due to the labour  
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18 movement’s broad inclusiveness, since “women, low-skill, and service-sector workers outside the  
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20 industrial core are almost as well-organized as blue-collar workers in industry” (Thelen, 2014, p.  
21  
22 176), mostly within the peak blue-collar confederation LO. Furthermore, it has been shown that  
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24 NSR groups are more likely to unionize when the industrial relations system relates to “organized  
25  
26 corporatism” (Shin & Ylä-Anttila, 2018). This outsider-inclusiveness among Swedish unions has  
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28 led to policy preferences that are more attentive to young people’s social protection, and  
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30 unemployment support has thus adapted to these new situations.  
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36 This has resulted in a strategy comprising three types of reform. First, the secondary labour  
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38 market has been widely deregulated in Sweden, unlike the primary labour market (Davidsson &  
39  
40 Emmenegger, 2012), which is in line with previous quantitative results emphasizing the trade-off  
41  
42 between youth social citizenship and the regulation of the secondary labour market (see *supra*).  
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44 Second, policymakers have simultaneously fostered social investment policies by developing both  
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46 higher education and training programmes within ALMP, returning to the core of the so-called  
47  
48 “Rehn-Meidner” model (Anxo & Niklasson, 2006). Third, unemployment support has adapted to  
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50 these new situations.  
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54 In comparison with those of other countries, Swedish unemployment benefits are an  
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56 important part of the replacement rate for young people; they are made up of earnings-related  
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benefits (unemployment insurance) and flat-rate benefits (unemployment assistance). Unemployment insurance depends on both past contributions and union membership. As a result, it is not the primary source of income maintenance for the young unemployed, who are usually newcomers to the labour market. Unemployment assistance also depends on past contributions – although having been in training used to qualify a person to receive this benefit, which allowed many young people over 19 to claim it (in the late 1970s, more than half of recipients were under 25, see Ginsburg, 1982, p. 24). In 2007, this option was abolished (Sjöberg, 2012, p. 213), leading to an overall decline in unemployment benefits coverage for the young (Angelin et al., 2014, p. 178).

Social assistance has therefore become one of the main benefits unemployed young people can claim, since it is not only free of any past work requirements, but also individualized (Angelin et al., 2014). Although social assistance is historically marginal in the Nordic welfare state (Gough et al., 1997), it did increase steeply in the 1990s because of the rise in youth unemployment and the fact that it is individualized, hence leading to the 1998 revision of the *Social Services Act*, which introduced an age limit of 25. However, since young people under 25 can claim it, this did not represent a familialization of the benefit. Such young people have, though, been required to take part in ALMP programmes in order to qualify for the benefit (Bergmark & Palme, 2003, p. 215): this reflects the perspective of a *learnfare* activation, which tries to combine “human capital investment”-oriented ALMP with income support (Bonoli, 2010).

In the wake of the development of “Youth Guarantee” programmes in 1995 (for 18-19 year-olds) and in 1998 (for 20-24 year-olds), a new “Youth Job Guarantee” for young people under 25 (*Jobbgarantin för ungdomar*) was introduced in 2007, to unify these youth-oriented programmes in line with the aim of improving both the social protection and the activation of outsiders in general (Obinger et al., 2012, p. 194) - though it was a right-wing government that adopted it. These

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3 programmes have two characteristics: they are supposed to activate the young unemployed mainly  
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5 towards education and training (compulsory after three months of unemployment for young  
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7 people), and they provide flat-rate income support (Sjöberg, 2012, p. 214). From a comparative  
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9 perspective, the inclusiveness of unions has therefore put Sweden on a trajectory in which the  
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11 individualized social citizenship of young people provides them with a fairly generous, activated  
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13 support when unemployed.  
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17 The low participation of young people in trade unions in the UK (which has significantly  
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19 declined still further over time, see Keune, 2015) **contributes to** the difference in welfare generosity  
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21 towards the young unemployed, despite similar individualization. The UK belongs to the “liberal”  
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23 welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and the “pluralist” model of labour relations (Crouch,  
24  
25 1993). It has followed a “deregulation” trajectory in which both strategic coordination and social  
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27 coverage have diminished (Thelen, 2014). And this low level of “solidarity” is partly due to less  
28  
29 inclusive unions: NSR groups are less likely to unionize in a “liberal” industrial relations system  
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31 (Shin & Ylä-Anttila, 2018), resulting in a level of union density and inclusiveness that is lower  
32  
33 overall (see *supra*). As a result, unions not only have a weaker effect on welfare reforms in general,  
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35 but are also less likely to take into account young people in particular. As a result, income support  
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37 and replacement rates for the young unemployed depend even more on partisan politics, and are  
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39 more likely to be reduced by anti-welfare governments.  
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45 Indeed, the Conservative government passed several social assistance reforms in the 1980s,  
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47 some of which explicitly targeted young people (Harris, 1989). Having raised the age limit for  
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49 claiming social assistance from 16 to 18 in 1986, the distinction between “householder” (living in  
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51 own home) and “non-householder” (living in parents’ home) that formerly determined the rate of  
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53 benefit was replaced by a further age limit: despite the right to claim social assistance at the age of  
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55 18, those under the age of 25 receive a lower rate. As in Sweden, this is not a familialized age limit  
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3 - yet unlike Sweden, it reflects the logic of *workfare*, decreasing the overall replacement rate for  
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5 young people in order to fight welfare dependency and push young people into work (“incentive  
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7 reinforcement”-oriented ALMP, see Bonoli, 2010), in the context of a tax-cutting budget (Millar,  
8  
9 2009, pp. 14 and following). When the *Jobseeker’s Allowance* was introduced in 1996, this feature  
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11 remained in place.  
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## 17 **6. Conclusion**

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19 Young people concentrate socioeconomic difficulties and their entry into adulthood, because of  
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21 high unemployment, has something to do with a “new social risk” (Bonoli, 2005). The literature  
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23 has so far mainly focused on social investment policies (Garritzmann et al 2022), such as education  
24  
25 and ALMP, assuming that it is the type of social policies most adequate for young people. However,  
26  
27 young people are also in demand for income support in certain situations, and especially as  
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29 newcomers on the labour market when in search for employment. The objective of the article is to  
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31 investigate an NSR and a population that is usually considered to be dealt with by the “new welfare  
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33 state” (i.e. a population-based perspective), while considering social policy instruments that have  
34  
35 more to do with the classic “passive” welfare state (i.e. a policy-instrument perspective). And there  
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37 is important cross-national variation in terms of access to social benefits and welfare generosity.  
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39 This article thus theorizes how the welfare state copes with such an NSR, by distinguishing between  
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41 the “familialization” of youth social citizenship and its “individualization”, in the wake of the  
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43 feminist literature on the welfare state: feminist concepts can help thinking access to social benefits  
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45 beyond the specific case of women – here young people. To explain these differences, this article  
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47 stresses not only the long-term importance of religion but also the more recent role played by trade  
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49 unions.  
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3 First, I have shown that the individualization of youth social citizenship is associated with  
4 Protestantism. However, this is not, as most neo-Rokkanian studies have argued (Van Kersbergen  
5 & Manow, 2009), a result of Catholicism, the church/state cleavage of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, class  
6 coalitions, or even the significance of Christian-Democratic parties (Manow, 2009). As far as youth  
7 social citizenship is concerned, the religious cleavage that emerged in the 16<sup>th</sup> century as a result  
8 of the Reformation (already present in Lipset and Rokkan's work) seems most important. It led to  
9 the early fusion of church and state in the case of Protestantism, and hence to the inclusion of  
10 welfare duties (that had hitherto fallen to the church) in the hands of the state. Such a result echoes  
11 Morgan's argument about the Swedish welfare state and how it copes with working mothers  
12 (Morgan, 2006), as well as Ansell and Lindvall's study on the effects of the presence of an  
13 established church on the secularization of primary education systems (Ansell & Lindvall, 2013,  
14 2020). Timing was crucial: early state intervention in poor relief and unemployment support  
15 allowed many young people to claim these benefits before youth even became identified as a life  
16 period, resulting in the lasting implementation of early age limits. By contrast, where the church  
17 kept welfare provision in its hands for a longer period of time, state intervention arrived later,  
18 resulting in higher age limits, and hence familialization. Against the argument of the "shadow of  
19 the nineteenth century" (Iversen & Soskice, 2009; Martin & Swank, 2011), I have therefore  
20 stressed the underestimated, long-lasting shadow of the sixteenth century and the religious cleavage  
21 that took place at the time - surprisingly even for an issue that has to do with the "new welfare  
22 state" (Bonoli & Natali, 2012). Still, it is here an "institutional" mechanism rather than a "cultural"  
23 mechanism related to different denominations (Kahl, 2005; Martin & Chevalier, 2022). **One must**  
24 **keep in mind though the complexity of the question under scrutiny and the possibility of multiple**  
25 **causation, since for instance Ireland, which is a Catholic country, appears to be in the group of**  
26 **"individualized" countries.**

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3 Second, I underline the role played by trade unions and the extent to which young people  
4 unionize. While the literature on political participation focuses on voting and new “non-  
5 institutional” forms of participation (Albacete, 2014), I show that – in terms of policymaking  
6 relating to youth social citizenship – these types of participation do not matter. What does matter  
7 for young people’s access to social benefits is their unionization, in opposition to the literature  
8 arguing that unions are drivers of dualization (Lindbeck & Snower, 1988). This result echoes recent  
9 studies on trade unions, underlining the importance of their “inclusiveness” (Gordon, 2015;  
10 Rathgeb, 2018; Thelen, 2014). So far, these studies have mainly focused on the socio-economic  
11 profile of union members, but I have shown here that the *age* profile of union members is also  
12 significant, since young people are one of the main groups of outsiders that suffer as a result of  
13 transformation of the labour market (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Hassel, 2015).  
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28 These general conclusions have important implications for the welfare state. Although religion  
29 seems to be the main factor explaining long-term cross-national variation in terms of youth social  
30 citizenship, it is no longer relevant to matters of short-term reform; trade unions are more important  
31 in that respect. However, despite a growing need for improved social protection for young people,  
32 union membership and density are gradually declining in every country, though at different paces  
33 (Schnabel, 2013). This is truer still of young people, who are more inclined to participate in “non-  
34 institutional” forms than in such “institutional” forms as trade unions (Albacete, 2014). Will young  
35 people’s income support become less and less generous, as they become more and more at risk of  
36 unemployment and poverty? Likewise, neither their mobilization in voting, nor in political parties  
37 seems to matter - which would refute studies emphasizing the continuing effects of political parties  
38 on welfare reforms (Beramendi et al., 2015; Busemeyer, 2015; Garritzmann & Seng, 2020). How  
39 is it possible for young people’s access to income support to become more generous? Further  
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3 research is needed on that matter, and the current economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic  
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5 may yet offer new insights into the conditions leading to reforms that will help young people.  
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8 Lastly, statistical evidence has suggested the presence of an institutional trade-off between old  
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10 age spending and generous welfare support for the young. In other words, the age orientation of  
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12 the welfare state (in terms of social consumption at least) could be a zero-sum game rather than a  
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14 win-win situation: in a context of budgetary restraints, policymakers need to make a choice about  
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16 which age group would benefit most from the welfare state. Yet, policymakers tend to favor more  
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18 the elderly as they are more numerous and more inclined to vote (Vlandas, 2018), which can lead  
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20 *ipso facto* to a decline in young people's income support. Further research is therefore needed on  
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22 such trade-off and the conditions under which reforms in favour of the young are adopted.  
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21 <sup>a</sup> See the comparative online database on social protection: <https://www.missoc.org>

22 <sup>b</sup> In his TSCS analyses, Garritzmann (2016) uses variables about student support spending, and not coverage, which  
23 does not grasp the individualization dimension I am interested in here.

24 <sup>c</sup> Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,  
25 Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.

26 <sup>d</sup> Following Honaker and King (2010), I have also used their algorithm in order to impute missing values (through  
27 multiple imputation) in five new different datasets. Despite some differences regarding the other variables, the new  
28 analyses run on these datasets generally confirm both the sign and the significance of the main independent variables,  
29 i.e. Protestantism and the participation of young people in unions. Results are available on request.

30 <sup>e</sup> These two countries display nevertheless rather similar levels of youth participation in unions (Figure 4), in order to  
31 control for this factor.

32 <sup>f</sup> Actually 16- and 17-year olds can still claim benefits even now, in certain circumstances such as homelessness, being  
33 care leavers, estranged from parents, etc.

34 <sup>g</sup> While these policies were targeting young people under 19 in the UK at the same time; see Brown (1990, 107).

35 <sup>h</sup> Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) also argue that we find “encompassing unionism” in Sweden with both a high level  
36 of union density and a high level of low-income inclusiveness.  
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




Figure 1. The tripartition of the life course




*Figure 2. Estimated effect of a one standard deviation change in the (significant) independent variables on the individualization of youth social citizenship*

Source: based on Model 5 from Table 3.



**Figure 3. Replacement rates for unemployed 20-year-olds (%) in France, Sweden and the UK, 2001-2018**

Source: OECD Tax-Benefit web calculator (see *supra*), author's calculation



*Figure 4. Protestantism (left y-axis) and young people's participation in unions (right y-axis) (country means).*

Source: Martin (1978); Inglehart and Norris (2004); ESS (2002-2020)




Figure 5. Age limits in France (left) and the UK (right), 1945-2018

Note: The ages of political majority (right to vote) and civil majority are the same in each country. The age limit for family benefits concerns children in full-time education. With regard to compulsory schooling, the year is the one in which the reform was adopted (not implemented).

Table 1. The two ideal-types of youth social citizenship

	<b>Familialization</b>	<b>Individualization</b>
<b>Representation of youth</b>	Childhood	Adulthood
<b>Maintenance obligations</b>	Yes	No
<b>Status of students</b>	Children	Adults
<b>Student support</b>		
<i>Family policies</i>	Yes	No
<i>Grants/loans</i>	Restricted: conditional on parental income	Extensive: conditional on young people's income
<b>Status in social welfare</b>	As a dependent person	As an independent person
<b>Age limits</b>	High (around 25)	Low (around 18)
<b>Welfare generosity</b>	Low	High

Table 2. Hypotheses on the origins of youth social citizenship

**Religious-based hypotheses:**

H1: The more prevalent Catholicism is in a country, expressed through the position of Christian-Democratic parties in party systems, the less individualized youth social citizenship will be.

H2: The more prevalent Protestantism is in a country, the more individualized youth social citizenship will be.

**Age-based hypotheses:**

H3: The more (less) young (old) people vote, the more individualized youth social citizenship will be.

H4: The more young people participate in unions, the more individualized youth social citizenship will be.

H5: The more young people are engaged in non-institutional political participation, the more individualized youth social citizenship will be.

Table 3. Determinants of youth social citizenship (Prais-Winsten regressions)

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Christian-Democracy	0.0114					0.0284*
	(0.0190)					(0.0158)
Protestantism		14.54***				10.33***
		(1.525)				(1.594)
Vote 18-29			0.00660			-0.0189
			(0.0449)			(0.0317)
Young in unions				0.376***		0.241***
				(0.0655)		(0.0637)
Young in demonstrations					-0.0731	-0.0145
					(0.0884)	(0.0459)
Constant	36.75**	-12.00	34.83**	34.78**	35.43**	-11.42
	(16.84)	(14.41)	(17.24)	(15.24)	(16.67)	(13.17)
Observations	178	178	162	159	162	159
R-squared	0.719	0.729	0.719	0.756	0.721	0.813
Number of countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.




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**Supplementary material**

**The Origins of Youth Social Citizenship in Europe:**

**Religion, Trade Unions and Income Support for Young People**

*Socio-Economic Review*

**Figure A1.** The youth social citizenship index, per country and per year

Source: OECD and Eurydice, author's calculation

Table A1: descriptions and sources of variables

VARIABLES	Definition	Source
Replacement rate	Net income (% of national average wage) for a 20-year-old person, single and without children, without a job for the past two months and without any month of	OECD "Tax-benefit web calculator"

	social security contributions, and with previous earnings equal to 0% of the average wage but annual housing costs of 20% of the average wage	
Youth unemployment	Youth (15-24) unemployment rate (%)	OECD
Christian-Democracy	Share of seats of centre parties in total cabinet posts (%)	Comparative Political Data Set
Left	Share of seats of left parties in total cabinet posts (%)	Comparative Political Data Set
Social spending	Social spending as a share of GDP (%)	OECD
Bismarckian index	Share of social security contributions in total taxation (%)	OECD
Christian-Democracy heritage	Share of seats of centre parties in total cabinet posts (%) – average 1960-2001	Comparative Political Data Set

Left heritage	Share of seats of left parties in total cabinet posts (%) – average 1960-2001	Comparative Political Data Set
Spending on training-ALMP	Public spending on training oriented ALMP (% GDP)	OECD
Tertiary attainment	Share of people aged 30-34 with tertiary attainment	Eurostat
Household size 1950	Household size in 1950, except for Ireland, Switzerland, Hungary and Poland (1960); Estonia and Slovenia are missing	Kuijsten 1996, 124
Spending on old age	Spending on old age pensions (% GDP)	OECD
Debt	Gross public debt (% GDP)	Comparative Political Data Set
Growth	Growth rate (%)	OECD
Share of 65+	Share of the population aged 65+ (%)	OECD
Union density	Trade union density	Comparative Political Data Set

Student support coverage	Share of students in receipt of support (%)	Eurydice
Vote 18-29	Share of people aged 18-29 having voted at last national election	ESS
Vote 60+	Share of people aged 60+ having voted at last national election	ESS
Young in unions	Share of people aged 18-29 member of trade union or similar organization	ESS
Young in demonstrations	Share of people aged 18-29 having taken part in lawful public demonstration	ESS
EPL-secondary	Strictness of employment protection legislation – temporary employment	OECD
Protestantism	3=Protestant majority, 2=significant Protestant minority (mixed country), 1=no presence of Protestantism	Based on Martin 1978; Inglehart and Norris, 2004

GDP/capita	GDP per capita (log)	OECD
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Table A2: descriptive statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Replacement rate	352	19.36	9.994	0	38.42
Youth unemployment	354	18.71	10.20	4.600	58.25
Christian-Democracy	340	17.19	25.41	0	100
Left	340	35.58	34.52	0	100
Social spending	360	22.87	4.431	12.55	32.21
Bismarckian index	360	29.00	9.314	0.105	40.85
Christian-Democracy heritage	360	22.35	20.11	0	63.69
Left heritage	360	39.26	15.66	10.92	77.18
Spending on training-ALMP	324	0.207	0.156	0.01000	0.730
Tertiary attainment	357	36.36	10.06	11.60	56.30
Household size 1950	324	3.433	0.410	2.900	4.100
Spending on old age	298	8.972	3.196	2.980	17.09
Debt	336	74.67	36.38	6.668	191.4
Growth	357	1.838	3.057	-14.43	25.16
Share of 65+	268	16.52	2.124	10.76	21.45
Union density	241	33.40	20.40	6.531	78.01

Student support coverage	304	39.35	29.38	1	100
Vote 18-29	290	54.25	12.93	21.43	84.50
Vote 60+	290	83.49	7.632	57.19	96.18
Young in unions	284	18.92	17.34	1.700	70.68
Young in demonstrations	290	9.926	6.856	1.030	41.81
EPL-secondary	226	1.703	0.955	0.250	4.750
Index of youth social citizenship	304	29.18	18.51	0.500	67.19
Protestantism	360	1.700	0.844	1	3
GDP/capita	358	10.44	0.366	9.188	11.16

Table A3: models with lagged political independent variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Christian-Democracy heritage	-0.0618	-0.0594*			
	(0.0797)	(0.0357)			
Christian-Democracy (lag 1 year)	0.00168	0.0279*			
	(0.0192)	(0.0153)			

1				
2				
3	Protestantism	13.76***	13.23***	8.835***
4				
5				
6		(1.715)	(1.460)	(1.632)
7				
8	Youth unemployment		-0.0110	0.0863
9				
10			(0.0423)	(0.0686)
11				
12				
13	Share of 65+		-1.634***	-0.0141
14				
15			(0.292)	(0.430)
16				
17				
18	Left heritage		-0.0773*	-0.0121
19				
20			(0.0404)	(0.0522)
21				
22				
23	Left (lag 1 year)		0.0149*	0.00856
24				
25			(0.00863)	(0.00925)
26				
27				
28	Spending on old age		-1.233***	-2.068***
29				-1.344***
30				
31			(0.458)	(0.509)
32				(0.394)
33				
34	EPL-secondary		-1.679**	-3.727***
35				-1.974***
36				
37			(0.671)	(0.620)
38				(0.732)
39				
40	Social investment		0.0630	0.0290
41				
42			(0.147)	(0.190)
43				
44				
45	Social spending		1.058***	
46				
47			(0.302)	
48				
49				
50	GDP/capita		4.051	
51				
52			(4.300)	
53				
54				
55	Debt		-0.0568**	
56				
57			(0.0241)	
58				
59				
60				



1						
2						
3	Growth	-0.00944				
4						
5						
6		(0.0726)				
7						
8	Vote 60+ (lag 1 year)		0.204	0.217	0.0985	
9						
10			(0.127)	(0.167)	(0.106)	
11						
12						
13	Vote 18-29 (lag 1 year)		-0.122**	-0.0604	-0.0233	
14						
15			(0.0497)	(0.0504)	(0.0488)	
16						
17						
18	Young in unions (lag 1 year)		0.585***	0.357***	0.235***	
19						
20			(0.0573)	(0.0585)	(0.0495)	
21						
22						
23	Young in demonstrations (lag 1 year)		-0.221***	-0.0489		
24						
25			(0.0760)	(0.0633)		
26						
27						
28	Constant	-17.60	-11.59	-5.801	-16.60	1.609
29						
30		(31.33)	(41.98)	(25.65)	(31.69)	(34.75)
31						
32						
33						
34						
35						
36						
37	Observations	263	155	235	142	152
38						
39	R-squared	0.601	0.875	0.666	0.833	0.833
40						
41						
42	Number of pays	20	20	20	19	19
43						
44	Period dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
45						
46						
47	Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
48						

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Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A4: models without the period dummy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Christian-Democracy heritage	-0.0604	-0.0518			
	(0.0740)	(0.0320)			
Christian-Democracy	0.00648	0.0263**			
	(0.0177)	(0.0122)			
Protestantism	14.01***	13.24***			8.473***
	(1.624)	(1.328)			(1.534)
Youth unemployment		-0.0107		0.0928	
		(0.0388)		(0.0756)	
Share of 65+		-1.555***		-0.165	
		(0.272)		(0.418)	
Left heritage		-0.0587		0.00251	
		(0.0420)		(0.0485)	
Left		0.0144**		0.00910	
		(0.00678)		(0.0103)	
Spending on old age		-1.202***		-1.974***	-1.679***
		(0.436)		(0.494)	(0.486)
EPL-secondary		-1.818***		-4.324***	-2.343***
		(0.588)		(0.560)	(0.606)
Social investment		0.0610		0.168	

1					
2					
3					
4			(0.144)	(0.154)	
5					
6	Vote 60+		0.228*	0.309**	0.120
7					
8					
9			(0.124)	(0.137)	(0.110)
10					
11	Vote 18-29		-0.116**	-0.0807*	-0.0433
12					
13					
14			(0.0500)	(0.0442)	(0.0409)
15					
16	Young in unions		0.547***	0.339***	0.220***
17					
18					
19			(0.0578)	(0.0471)	(0.0545)
20					
21	Young in demonstrations		-0.239***	-0.0621	
22					
23					
24			(0.0675)	(0.0677)	
25					
26	Constant	-4.234	-0.398	-19.72	6.003
27					14.91
28					
29		(27.68)	(37.34)	(28.39)	(32.37)
30					(36.10)
31					
32					
33					
34	Observations	278	166	231	150
35					163
36					
37	R-squared	0.603	0.869	0.653	0.842
38					0.835
39					
40	Number of pays	20	20	20	20
41					20
42	Period dummy	NO	NO	NO	NO
43					NO
44					
45	Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
46					YES

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A5: models with random effects

57					
58		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
59					(5)
60					

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Christian-Democracy heritage	-0.0430	-0.159*			
	(0.119)	(0.0960)			
Christian-Democracy	0.0290**	-0.000884			
	(0.0142)	(0.0138)			
Protestantism	15.24***	17.99***			8.102***
	(2.859)	(2.630)			(2.126)
Youth unemployment		0.0166		0.114**	
		(0.0557)		(0.0529)	
Share of 65+		0.393		0.880*	
		(0.473)		(0.468)	
Left heritage		-0.244*		-0.00510	
		(0.134)		(0.151)	
Left		0.00916		0.0101	
		(0.00864)		(0.00707)	
Spending on old age		0.361		-0.119	0.0801
		(0.492)		(0.499)	(0.505)
EPL-secondary		0.211		-0.981	-2.472**
		(0.811)		(0.778)	(0.971)
Social investment		-0.803***		-0.507***	
		(0.170)		(0.164)	

1						
2						
3	Vote 60+			-0.0805	0.0230	-0.0641
4						
5						
6				(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.131)
7						
8	Vote 18-29			-0.0448	-0.0414	-0.0170
9						
10						
11				(0.0453)	(0.0358)	(0.0521)
12						
13	Young in unions			0.442***	0.425***	0.367***
14						
15						
16				(0.0669)	(0.0594)	(0.0700)
17						
18	Young in demonstrations			-0.176*	-0.0177	
19						
20						
21				(0.0919)	(0.0698)	
22						
23						
24	Constant	11.84	-116.0***	-30.05	-119.0***	-53.74**
25						
26						
27		(18.13)	(28.00)	(22.56)	(29.65)	(26.40)
28						
29						
30						
31	Observations	278	166	231	150	163
32						
33						
34	Number of pays	20	20	20	20	20
35						
36						
37	Random effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
38						
39	Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40						

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A6: models with alternate measure of IV (Bismarckian index instead of Protestantism)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4

1				
2				
3	Christian-Democracy heritage	-0.108*	-0.0697*	
4				
5				
6		(0.0632)	(0.0400)	
7				
8	Christian-Democracy	0.00690	0.0326*	
9				
10				
11		(0.0197)	(0.0194)	
12				
13	Bismarckian index	-0.777***	-0.427***	
14				
15				
16		(0.103)	(0.0490)	
17				
18	Youth unemployment		-0.0534	-0.0141
19				
20				
21			(0.0490)	(0.0843)
22				
23	Share of 65+		-0.0933	-0.166
24				
25				
26			(0.381)	(0.478)
27				
28	Left heritage		0.0613	0.0386
29				
30			(0.0449)	(0.0575)
31				
32	Left		0.0234***	0.00612
33				
34			(0.00863)	(0.00947)
35				
36	Spending on old age		-2.860***	-2.351***
37				
38			(0.505)	(0.573)
39				
40	EPL-secondary		-4.000***	-3.859***
41				
42			(0.604)	(0.627)
43				
44	Social investment		0.196	0.255
45				
46			(0.170)	(0.200)
47				
48	Vote 60+		0.231*	0.307***
49				
50			(0.120)	(0.117)
51				
52				
53				
54				
55				
56				
57				
58				
59				
60				

Vote 18-29			-0.0680	-0.0461
			(0.0422)	(0.0417)
Union density			0.399***	0.203***
			(0.0416)	(0.0460)
Young in demonstrations			-0.162**	-0.0179
			(0.0633)	(0.0634)
Constant	-0.213	22.63	-35.55	9.551
	(34.91)	(41.29)	(27.43)	(32.28)
Observations	278	166	180	149
R-squared	0.532	0.812	0.686	0.817
Number of pays	20	20	20	20
Period dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A7: models with alternate measure of DV (only replacement rate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Christian-Democracy heritage	-0.0582***	-0.0281		

1			
2			
3		(0.0215)	(0.0295)
4			
5			
6	Christian-Democracy	0.0190**	0.0260*
7			
8		(0.00852)	(0.0152)
9			
10			
11	Protestantism	4.488***	2.443**
12			
13		(0.776)	(1.063)
14			
15			
16	Household size 1950		2.288*
17			
18			
19		(1.690)	(1.387)
20			
21	Youth unemployment		-0.0961**
22			
23			
24		(0.0551)	(0.0396)
25			
26	Share of 65+		-0.599***
27			
28			
29		(0.250)	(0.222)
30			
31	Left heritage		0.134***
32			
33			
34		(0.0220)	(0.0288)
35			
36	Left		0.0143*
37			
38			
39		(0.00838)	(0.00823)
40			
41			
42	Spending on old age		0.337
43			
44			
45		(0.266)	(0.246)
46			
47	EPL-secondary		-4.491***
48			
49			
50		(0.592)	(0.553)
51			
52	Social investment		0.0902
53			
54			
55		(0.170)	(0.144)
56			
57	Vote 60+		
58			0.0201
59			
60			-0.204***



			(0.0653)	(0.0756)
Vote 18-29			-0.0551**	-0.199***
			(0.0266)	(0.0393)
Young in unions			0.225***	0.273***
			(0.0304)	(0.0248)
Young in demonstrations			-0.0281	0.235***
			(0.0474)	(0.0535)
Constant	2.243	-16.98	5.558	13.08
	(15.31)	(20.64)	(12.82)	(23.26)
Observations	324	194	273	175
R-squared	0.627	0.759	0.666	0.846
Number of pays	20	18	20	18
Period dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A-8: OLS regressions

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Christian-Democracy	0.0619					
	(0.0502)					

1						
2						
3	Protestantism	16.31***				8.593***
4		(0.638)				(0.771)
5	Vote 18-29		0.0534			
6			(0.0802)			
7	Young in unions			0.821***		0.511***
8				(0.0309)		(0.0375)
9	Young in demonstrations				-0.517***	-0.208***
10					(0.142)	(0.0725)
11	Constant	26.70***	0.0376	24.85***	12.30***	32.88***
12		(1.249)	(1.211)	(4.465)	(0.782)	(1.666)
13						(1.378)
14	Observations	18	18	18	18	18
15	R-squared	0.004	0.646	0.001	0.664	0.036
16	Period dummy	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
17	Controls	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A-9: new measure of Christian Democracy (percentage of ministers from Christian Democratic parties in government, see Schmitdt et al 2023)**

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Christian Democracy (from Schmidt et al 2023)	-0.0137	0.00989
	(0.0234)	(0.0244)
Protestantism		12.38***
		(1.621)
Vote 18-29		-0.0473
		(0.0399)
Young in unions		0.333***
		(0.0694)
Young in demonstrations		-0.0796
		(0.0748)
Constant	80.09***	-3.200
	(13.15)	(11.15)
Observations	252	210
R-squared	0.373	0.687
Number of pays	16	16
Controls	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A-10: new DV (replacement rate for a second profile)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Christian-Democracy	-0.00202 (0.00935)					0.0458*** (0.0168)
Protestantism		9.734*** (1.116)				4.594*** (0.908)
Vote 18-29			-0.0185 (0.0225)			-0.0846** (0.0332)
Young in unions				0.329*** (0.0635)		0.345*** (0.0475)
Young in demonstrations					-0.145* (0.0774)	-0.247** (0.0980)
Constant	30.42*** (1.077)	12.91*** (1.914)	31.21*** (1.400)	23.27*** (1.232)	31.79*** (1.137)	21.37*** (2.768)
Observations	306	324	262	256	262	256
R-squared	0.469	0.559	0.500	0.578	0.506	0.644
Number of pays	18	18	18	18	18	18
Controls	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: The replacement rate is here calculated for a 24-year-old, in a couple but without children, and without a job (as well as their partner) for the past two months, with three months of social security contributions and previous earnings equal to 10% of the average wage.