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Article Dans Une Revue European Journal of Political Economy Année : 2006

Capital taxation and electoral accountability

Toke S. Aidt
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Francesco Magris
  • Fonction : Auteur
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Résumé

This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second-best (Ramsey) tax policy. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Dates et versions

hal-02877993 , version 1 (22-06-2020)

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Toke S. Aidt, Francesco Magris. Capital taxation and electoral accountability. European Journal of Political Economy, 2006, 22 (2), pp.277--291. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.06.007⟩. ⟨hal-02877993⟩

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