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Article Dans Une Revue International Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2018

The quality effect of intra-firm bargaining with endogenous worker flows

Tristan-Pierre Maury
  • Fonction : Auteur
Fabien Tripier
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1011113

Résumé

The performance of the labor market depends not only on the quantity of jobs in the economy, but also on the quality of jobs. This paper proposes a new theoretical explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models. We develop a matching and intra-firm bargaining model in which large firms hire workers and decide to destroy low-productivity job–worker matches. The sources of inefficiency include the well-known quantitative effect of intra-firm bargaining, namely, the excessive size of the firms concerned; and a new quality effect, namely, the poor quality of the job–worker matches selected by firms. © IAET

Dates et versions

hal-02877944 , version 1 (22-06-2020)

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Tristan-Pierre Maury, Fabien Tripier. The quality effect of intra-firm bargaining with endogenous worker flows. International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 15 (2), pp.183--207. ⟨10.1111/ijet.12164⟩. ⟨hal-02877944⟩
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