Ethnography of the Teaching of Logic
Résumé
This article provides a frame of analysis for the social study of logic, starting from
an ethnographical account of the teaching of logic. This account is based on an inquiry
conducted in the department of philosophy of a major University located in the United States. I
analyze how the discourse of logic in the classrooms can be constituted as holding by itself, or
self-sustaining. I argue, first, that an autonomous language is constituted around a few isolated
words, through several strategies of differentiation. I analyze in particular how the dichotomy
between formal and informal knowledge can be formed, and how the categories of logical
language, ordinary language, and intuition are co-constructed. I then argue that the process of
differentiation is supported by an elaborate technology of showing, and that this technology is
also used to build demonstrations. I show in particular that, between two steps of reasoning, is a
moment of exhibition or de-monstration. Finally, I examine how doubt is managed, targeted and
controlled in front of de-monstrations, and how radical doubt can be limited by temporal
constraints.
an ethnographical account of the teaching of logic. This account is based on an inquiry
conducted in the department of philosophy of a major University located in the United States. I
analyze how the discourse of logic in the classrooms can be constituted as holding by itself, or
self-sustaining. I argue, first, that an autonomous language is constituted around a few isolated
words, through several strategies of differentiation. I analyze in particular how the dichotomy
between formal and informal knowledge can be formed, and how the categories of logical
language, ordinary language, and intuition are co-constructed. I then argue that the process of
differentiation is supported by an elaborate technology of showing, and that this technology is
also used to build demonstrations. I show in particular that, between two steps of reasoning, is a
moment of exhibition or de-monstration. Finally, I examine how doubt is managed, targeted and
controlled in front of de-monstrations, and how radical doubt can be limited by temporal
constraints.